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Abstract
We propose a public goods game model of user sharing in an online commenting forum.
In particular, we assume that users who share personal information incur an information cost
but reap the benefits of a more extensive social interaction. Freeloaders benefit from the same
social interaction but do not share personal information. The resulting public goods struc-
ture is analyzed both theoretically and empirically. In particular, we show that the proposed
game always possesses equilibria and we give sufficient conditions for pure strategy equilibria to
emerge. These correspond to users who always behave the same way, either sharing or hiding
personal information. We present an empirical analysis of a relevant data set, showing that our
model parameters can be fit and that the proposed model has better explanatory power than a
corresponding null (linear) model of behavior.
1 Introduction
Recent work acknowledges the importance of online social engagement, noting that the bidirectional
communication of the Internet allows readers to engage directly with reporters, peers, and news
outlets to discuss issues of the day [1–3]. In parallel, studies have noted several challenges linked
with this new form of readership, particularly the high level of toxicity and pollution from trolls
and even bots often observed in these commentaries [4]. While the negative impacts of trolling and
abuse are well-studied (see, e.g., [5, 6]), little attention has been paid to other more subtle risks
involved with online commenting, particularly with respect to users’ privacy. In particular, as users
engage in discussion online, they often resort to self-disclosure as a way to enhance immediate social
rewards [7], increase legitimacy and likeability [8], or derive social support [9]. By self-disclosure, we
refer to the (possibly unintentional) act of disclosing identifying (e.g., location, age, gender, race)
or sensitive (e.g., political affiliation, religious beliefs, cognitive and/or emotional vulnerabilities)
personal information [10].
In this work, we model the behavior of users posting comments about newspaper articles on ma-
jor news platforms (e.g., NYT, CNN). We hypothesize that all users who participate in commentary
about an article receive a “reward” that is proportional to the number of total comments posted;
i.e., the net amount of social engagement generated. Hence, the act of self-disclosing comes at an
information cost to the individual user yet may serve to increase the net return (e.g., total num-
ber of comments or impact the conversation in some capacity) all users receive. Accordingly, this
scenario can be envisaged as a public goods game in which pay-in is measured in terms of personal
∗Authors are listed in alphabetical order.
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information and pay-out is measured in net quantity of social interaction through a commenting
system.
Public goods games are mathematical representations of the Tragedy of the Commons [11,12] in
which individuals must contribute to a common good in order to prevent that good from collapsing.
Within a public goods game, cheating or freeloading is generally a more profitable choice; in this
way, it is intellectually similar to the prisoner’s dilemma (see, e.g., [13,14]), and various approaches
to resolving the tragedy have been taken (e.g., [15]). Public goods games have been widely studied
as models of cooperation. In [16], the public goods game poses the following dilemma to a group of
N agents: each agent is asked to contribute c monetary units towards a public good. Contributions
earn a linear rate of return r, providing rc monetary units for sharing. Thus, if k individuals
contribute, a contributing individual receives rck/N − c monetary units, while a non-contributing
individual receives rck/N monetary units. Rational agents choose not to contribute.
There are several extensions to the classical public goods framework discussed above. Archetti
and Scheuring [17] and Young and Belmonte [18] use a non-linear (power law) form of the public
goods return function. We adopt this model in Section 3. Cooperation in a public goods setting
is difficult to explain using a rational agent assumption and several approaches have been used to
explain it. Volunteering in public goods is considered in [19]. Punishment as a form of cooperation
enforcement is discussed in [20,21]. Reputation in an evolutionary public goods game is considered
in [22]. The approach we take in this paper is substantially simpler; as we discuss in Section 3,
we assume that each agent has a distinct information sharing cost, which leads to the emergence
of equilibria in which users will share. Primary contributions of this paper are: development of a
public goods model of personal information disclosure; proof of sufficient conditions for this game
to to exhibit pure strategy equilibria; proof of existance of at least one equilibrium for any choice of
model parameters; identification of necessary and sufficient conditions in specific cases; and, initial
validation of the proposed model in a dataset of online comments on news articles.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we discuss the data set used
for model development and testing. We present our proposed model in Section 3. Mathematical
analysis of the model is performed in Section 4. Experimental evidence supporting our model of
user behavior is presented in Section 5. Finally, we provide conclusions and future directions in
Section 6.
2 Data Description
We consider a set of user comments on news articles from four major English news websites [23].
The data set is composed of 59, 249 comments made by 22, 132 distinct users from March through
August 2015. Comments are distributed across 2202 articles from The Huffington Post (1136),
Techcrunch (119), CNBC (421) and ABC News (526). On average, each user contributes 2.68
comments and participates in discussions related to 1.77 articles.
We use the unsupervised detection of self-disclosure proposed and validated in our earlier work
[10] to label these comments. Each comment is labeled for the presence or absence of self-disclosure,
and each incidence of self-disclosure is tagged by category. We determine 10, 858 of the total 59, 249
comments to be self-disclosing. Methods and initial results for self-disclosure tagging on this data
set, including a breakdown of self-disclosures by category, are discussed in [10].
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3 Model
Let Ri be the total number of comments associated with article i. This is also the common reward
to all commenters regardless of whether they provide personal information. Define the binary
variable δk = 1 if and only if User k provides personal information in a comment at least once.
Using a public goods framework, we hypothesize the relationship:
Ri ∼ A ·
(∑
k
δik
)γ
+ i, (1)
where γ is a scaling factor and A is constant of proportionality. The quantity i is the (normally
distributed) error associated with Article i. The individual payoff to users in this pubic goods
framework is:
rik = Ri − βkδk, (2)
where βk measures the sensitivity to information sharing for User k. In a totally symmetric game,
β = β1 = · · · = βN .
4 Mathematical Analysis
We analyze the model assuming that:
δj ∼ Bernoulli(xj), (3)
where xj ∈ [0, 1] is the probability that user j will disclose personal information. In a simultaneous
game with n users, each user will selfishly maximize her expected reward, which can be computed
on the interior of the feasible region as:
uj = E(rj) =
∑
δ1∈{0,1}
· · ·
∑
δn∈{0,1}
A
(∑
k
δk
)γ∏
k
xδkk (1− xk)1−δk − βjxj . (4)
If for any k, xk is a pure strategy, then δk = xk and uj is modified in the obvious way to prevent
expressions of the form 00. In particular, if B = {0, 1} and x ∈ Bn is pure, then:
uj = A
(∑
k
xk
)γ
− βjxj = A
(∑
k
δk
)γ
− βjδj . (5)
Put more simply, this is just an n-player, n-array (tensor) game, where each player has two strate-
gies: disclose or don’t disclose. The payoff structure is given by n multi-linear maps:
A(j) : R2 × · · · × R2︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
→ R.
The following result is guaranteed by Wilson’s extension [24] of Nash’s theorem [25] and the Lemke-
Howson theorem [26]:
Proposition 1. There is at least one Nash equilibrium solution in simultaneous play. If the game
is non-degenerate there are an odd number of equilibria.
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Fix the strategies for all users other than j and denote this x−j . The (tensor) contraction
A(j)(x−j) is a one-form (row vector). Assume:
A(j)(x−j) =
[
C
(j)
1 (x−j) C
(j)
0 (x−j)
]
, (6)
with:
C
(j)
1 (x−j) =
∑
δ−j∈Bn−1
A
1 +∑
k 6=j
δk
γ∏
k 6=j
xδkk (1− xk)1−δk − βj ,
C
(j)
0 (x−j) =
∑
δ−j∈Bn−1
A
∑
k 6=j
δk
γ∏
k 6=j
xδkk (1− xk)1−δk .
As in Eq. (5), care must be taken with this expression if xk is pure.
If xj = 〈xj , 1− xj〉, then:
uj(xj ,x−j) =
〈
A(j)(x−j),xj
〉
= C
(j)
1 (x−j)xj + C
(j)
0 (x−j)(1− xj) =(
C
(j)
1 (x−j)− C(j)0 (x−j)
)
xj + C
(j)
0 (x−j). (7)
A strategy vector x = (xj ,x−j) is an equilibrium precisely when it solves the simultaneous opti-
mization problem:
∀j
{
max uj(xj ,x−j)
s.t. 0 ≤ xj ≤ 1.
(8)
We note the optimization problem for each Player j is a linear programming problem.
Proposition 2. A point x is an equilibrium if and only if there are vectors λ,µ ∈ Rn so that the
following conditions hold:
PF
{
xj − 1 ≤ 0 ∀j
−xj ≤ 0 ∀j
(9)
DF

∂uj
∂xj
+ λj − µj = 0 ∀j
λj ≥ 0 ∀j
µj ≥ 0 ∀j
(10)
CS
{
−λjxj = 0 ∀j
µj(xj − 1) = 0 ∀j
. (11)
Here:
∂uj
∂xj
= C
(j)
1 (x−j)− C(j)0 (x−j). (12)
Proof. Eq. (12) follows from Eq. (7). The remaining conditions are primal and dual feasibility
(PF, DF) conditions and complementary slackness (CS) conditions from the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker
(KKT) theorem as applied to linear programming problems.
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Corollary 3. A point x is an equilibrium if and only if there are vectors λ,µ ∈ Rn and the triple
(x,λ,µ) is a global optimal solution to the following non-linear programming problem:
min
∑
j
λjxj + µj(1− xj) =
∑
j
µj − xj
(
C
(j)
1 (x−j)− C(j)0 (x−j)
)
s.t. C
(j)
1 (x−j)− C(j)0 (x−j) + λj − µj = 0 ∀j
λj ≥ 0 ∀j
µj ≥ 0 ∀j
0 ≤ xj ≤ 1
. (13)
Furthermore every global optimal solution has objective function value exactly equal to 0.
Proof. The proof is a specialization of the argument given in Chapter 6 of [27]. In particular, note
that the feasible conditions enforce the inequalities:
λjxj ≥ 0
µj(1− xj) ≥ 0
Therefore, the objective function is bounded below by 0. If:∑
j
λjxj + µj(1− xj) = 0,
then λjxj = 0 and µj(1 − xj) = 0 for all j. When taken with the other constraints, this implies
that the triple (x,λ,µ) is a KKT point as given in Proposition 2. Finally, we see that:
C
(j)
1 (x−j)− C(j)0 (x−j) = µj − λj .
Algebraic manipulation shows that:∑
j
λjxj + µj(1− xj) =
∑
j
µj − xj
(
C
(j)
1 (x−j)− C(j)0 (x−j)
)
(14)
We note that the KKT conditions of Proposition 2 can also be transformed into a complemen-
tarity problem [28] and solved accordingly. Phrasing the problem as a non-linear programming
problem allows for solution of small-scale examples using readily available software packages.
We show that pure strategy equilibria exist for this game. The following sufficient condition
ensures there is at least one pure strategy equilibrium.
Proposition 4. Assume β1 ≤ β2 ≤ · · · ≤ βn and that:
βm ≤ Amγ −A(m− 1)γ
βm+1 ≥ A(m+ 1)γ −Amγ
Then the point x1 = x2 = · · ·xm = 1 and xm+1 = xi+2 = · · · = xn = 0 is an equilibrium in pure
strategies.
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Proof. The payoff to User j is:
uj =
{
Amγ − βj if 1 ≤ j ≤ m
Amγ otherwise
.
Suppose 1 ≤ j ≤ m and User j unilaterally alters her strategy to xj < 1. Then her new expected
payoff is:
u′j = Am
γxj − βxj + (1− xj)A(m− 1)γ .
Compute:
∆uj = u
′
j − uj = (1− xj)A(m− 1)γ − (1− xj) (Amγ − βj) =
(1− xj) (A(m− 1)γ −Amγ + βj) ≤ 0,
by assumption. Thus User j derives no benefit by unilaterally changing her strategy. Now assume
j ≥ m+ 1. Then:
u′j = A(m+ 1)
γxj − βjxj + (1− xj)Amγ .
Compute:
∆uj = A(m+ 1)
γxj − βjxj −Amγxj = xj (A(m+ 1)γ −Amγ − βj) ≤ 0,
by assumption. Thus User j derives no benefit by unilaterally changing her strategy. Therefore, the
point x1 = x2 = · · ·xm = 1 and xm+1 = xi+2 = · · · = xn = 0 is an equilibrium in pure strategies.
Because there may be many solutions to the KKT conditions from Proposition 2, there may be
mixed strategies even if the sufficient conditions are met. However, we can construct both neces-
sary and sufficient conditions for pure strategy equilibria in which all users either share personal
information or withhold personal information.
Proposition 5. The strategy x = 0 is an equilibrium if and only if A ≤ β1.
Proof. If x = 0 is an equilibrium, then µj = 0 for all j and:
C
(j)
1 (x−j)− C(j)0 (x−j) = −λ ∀j.
Correcting for the fact that x is on the boundary we see:
C
(j)
1 (x−j) = A− βj
C
(j)
0 (x−j) = 0
Thus, A− βj = −λ ≤ 0. It follows a fortiori that A ≤ β1.
Now suppose that A < β1 and consider the strategy x = 0. All users receive payoff 0. Suppose
User j unilaterally changes her strategy to xj > 0. Then her expected payoff is:
Axj − βjxj = (A− βj)xj ≤ 0,
because A ≤ β1 implying A ≤ βj for all j. Consequently no player has any incentive to unilaterally
change strategy and x is an equilibrium.
By a similar argument, we have:
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Proposition 6. The strategy x = 1 is an equilibrium if and only if A ≥ βn.
These results yield a sensible interpretation for the parameter A. If βj is the perceived social cost
of sharing personal information, then A is a common perceived social benefit of sharing information
and the decision to share or not becomes a simple cost-benefit analysis on the part of the user.
In practice, it is rare that all users in a thread will share personal information. Moreover,
users may not consistently share (or withhold) personal information, as illustrated in Section 5.
Consequently, mixed strategies may be common (as illustrated in Section 5) or A and βj (j =
1, . . . , n) may be context-dependent.
5 Experimental Results
Using the data set described in Section 2, we test our hypothesis that the number of comments (i.e.,
common reward) in a news posting game is modeled by Eq. (1). Articles with no comments were
removed as they yield no additional information. This left 1977 articles for analysis. The proposed
model is statistically significant above the 7σ level. Table 1 provides confidence information on
the parameters of the model. The model explains 51% of the variance in the observed data (i.e.,
Parameter Value p-Value Confid. Ival.
log(A) 2.20 0 (2.15, 2.25)
γ 0.71 1.4× 10−312 (0.68, 0.74)
Table 1: Parameters of the problem and confidence values
r2 − Adj ≈ 0.51). Fig. 1 illustrates the fit of the data to the proposed model. The residual
Log[R]∼2.2+0.71Log[Σkδk]
R2-Adjusted = 0.51
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Figure 1: We illustrate the goodness of the fit for the power law model, Eq. (1). A log-log scale is
used.
distribution is centered about zero and the Q − Q plot illustrates reasonable normality of the
residual distribution (see Fig. 2). Normality tests of the residuals showed mixed results with five of
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Figure 2: (a) The histogram of the fit residuals using Eq. (1) illustrates symmetry about 0. (b)
The Q−Q plot illustrates approximate normality of the residuals.
eight tests performed rejecting normality and the remaining tests failing to reject normality. Raw
output of distribution testing is given below:
Statistic p-Value
Anderson-Darling 1.29886 0.00198841
Baringhaus-Henze 1.88282 0.00824273
Crame´r-von Mises 0.18939 0.0067714
Jarque-Bera ALM 3.51543 0.168992
Mardia Combined 3.51543 0.168992
Mardia Kurtosis −1.88623 0.0592636
Mardia Skewness 0.0342508 0.853174
Pearson χ2 135.343 1.465× 10−12
Shapiro-Wilk 0.997751 0.00679984.
5.1 Null-Model Comparison
We compare the fit of the proposed model against the fit of a null linear model:
Ri ∼ β0 + β1
∑
k
(δik).
This model is also statistically significant above 7σ and explains 53% of the variance (i.e., r2−Adj =
0.53). The fit, illustrating correlation is shown in Fig. 3a. However, the residual distribution is
decidedly not normal as illustrated by the Q−Q plot (Fig. 3b). This suggests that linear correlation
is not the best explanation for the observed phenomena and supports our underlying hypothesis.
In addition to comparing relative fits, we also note that the AIC for the null model is 18, 289.4,
while the AIC for the proposed model is 3025.78, suggesting much better model parsimony for the
proposed model over the null model.
5.2 Fitting βj: A Pilot Study
As noted, this data set is not longitudinal and only a small number of users are repeat posters. This
makes it impossible to estimate either xj or βj for all users. However, there are a subset of users
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Figure 3: (a) We illustrate goodness of fit of the null (linear) model. (b) The Q−Q plot of residuals
of the null model illustrates clear lack of normality.
who are repeat posters making it possible to estimate their mixed strategies and consequently their
βj . We outline the algorithm for this process and discuss results. This algorithm works particularly
well when all players are using a mixed strategy. We note results in the remainder of this section
are preliminary and this should be considered as pilot data.
1. Compute xj using standard the standard MLE proportion estimator:
xˆj =
Number of Self Disclosing Posts
Number of Posts
. (15)
2. From Eq. (10) at equilibrium we must have:
C
(j)
1 (xˆ−j)− C(j)0 (xˆ−j) = µj − λj , ∀j.
These equations can be used to fit an estimate for βj + µj − λj .
In particular, when xˆj ∈ (0, 1), then λj = µj = 0 and:
βˆj =
∑
δ−j
A
1 +∑
k 6=j
δk
γ −
∑
k 6=j
δk
γ∏
k 6=j
xˆδkk (1− xˆk)(1−δk). (16)
If there are several articles (each with different number of users, N), then βˆj is computed over all
instances of Eq. (16) and the mean is the MLE of βˆj . In our analysis, xˆj was not available for all
users (because of data limitations). In analyzing an article with users who did not have a proper
xˆj , the mean of all available xˆj was substituted. We denote this mean x¯.
In cases with articles where several user strategies were estimated with x¯, we restricted the
analysis to size N = 8 users for computational speed. By the central limit theorem, this approxi-
mation will not affect the resulting estimates of bˆj substantially. Put more simply: An article with
34 users requires computing a sum with 233 summands. If 30 users are estimated as x¯, we used
only 8 of those users in computing Eq. (16).
Using this approach we estimated the strategy for all users in the data set who posted to at
least 15 articles. We used parameter estimates for A and γ obtained in the previous section. There
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Figure 4: (a) The histogram of the strategies suggests an almost uniform distribution between
xˆ = 0.1 and xˆ = 0.4 with a sharp dropoff after that. (b) Similarly, βj shows an almost uniform
distribution with a high concentration of values near 4.8. This histogram is drawn from a small
sample size, so we exercise care in interpreting these results.
were 135 users in this subsample. A histogram of their estimated strategies is shown in Fig. 4a. In
particular, all estimated strategies were mixed, suggesting that pure strategies, while possible, are
less likely to occur in real data. Using Eq. (16), we estimated βˆ in articles containing at least three
users for whom xˆj had been estimated. We estimated βˆj for 14 users who had posted at least 15
times and who had posted in at least one article with 2 other such users. The histogram of these
estimates is given in Fig. 4b.
To validate the hypothesis that higher βj is correlated with lower xj , we performed a simple
linear fit, which is shown in Fig. 5 A table of parameter values and confidence regions are shown
below, with the dependent variable being xˆj and the independent variable βˆj .
Estimate Standard Error t-Statistic P-Value
1 0.707635 0.354241 1.99761 0.0511066
βˆ −0.0922398 0.0745993 −1.23647 0.221948
The coefficient of βˆ is negative (as predicted). However, the model is only significant at p ≈ 0.22.
This is far too high to be considered conclusive, but is suggestive that additional data collection
and analysis may be warranted.
5.3 Alternate Method for Fitting βˆ
Inspired by techniques from crystallography and neutron scattering techniques [29], we also propose
an alternate fitting method, the analysis of which will be considered future work. Given an estimator
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Figure 5: We illustrate the correlation between xˆj and βˆj . We expect xˆj ∼ a0 − a1βj with a1 > 0,
which we see.
yˆ for individual user strategies, we define a complementarity constrained least-squares fit problem:
min
x,λ,µ,β
∑
j
(yˆj − xj)2
s.t. xj ≤ 1 ∀j
xj ≥ 0 ∀j∑
δ−j
A
1 +∑
k 6=j
δk
γ −
∑
k 6=j
δk
γ∏
k 6=j
xˆδkk (1− xˆk)(1−δk)+
λj − µj − βj = 0 ∀j
λj ≥ 0 ∀j
µj ≥ 0 ∀j
λjxj = 0 ∀j
µj(xj − 1) = 0 ∀j.
(17)
Solutions to this least square fit are tuples (x,λ,µ,β) where βj (j = 1, . . . , N) are now unknowns.
By Proposition 2, any vector x in such a solution is a Nash equilibrium for the derived vector β.
Moreover, the derived equilibrium minimizes the least square error with respect to the estimated
equilibrium yˆ, derived from Eq. (15). As a mixed complementarity problem, the proposed con-
strained least squares estimator is challenging to solve [30, 31], since these problems are known to
be NP-hard in general. Considering the limitations of the data, we reserve further analysis of this
approach for future work with a more complete data set.
6 Conclusions and Future Directions
In this paper, we have proposed a public goods model of personal information disclosure in news
article commentaries. We have found sufficient conditions for the proposed public goods game to
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exhibit pure strategy equilibria and showed that for any choice of model parameters, there is always
at least one equilibrium. Special necessary and sufficient conditions were identified for the case in
which all users choose not to disclose personal information or when all users choose to disclose
(some) personal information. We have validated this model using a dataset of online comments on
news outlets and showed that the proposed common reward function fits the underlying data set
better than a null (linear) model. For a small subset of users, we have estimated their strategy (xˆj)
as well as their sensitivity to personal information disclosure (βˆj). We consider this a pilot study
because the publicly available data set used in this study was not longitudinal, thus limiting our
ability to study a large population of users over time.
In future work, we will determine whether this model is valid using larger data sets when
available. In particular, we have proposed a fitting approach for determining βˆj that relies on
the solution to a large-scale mixed complementarity problem. Studying this fitting problem, its
complexity, and results from its application form the foundation of future work. In addition to this,
we may investigate other commenting environments in which users may choose to share personal
information to further validate this model and determine whether it holds across a broad spectrum
of online platforms.
Acknowledgements
Portions of Griffin’s work were supported by the National Science Foundation under grant CMMI-
1463482. Griffin also wishes to thank A. Belmonte for the helpful discussion. Dr. Squicciarini’s
work is partially funded by the National Science Foundation under grant 1453080. Dr. Squicciarini
and Dr. Rajtmajer are also partially supported by PSU Seed grant 425-02.
References
[1] N. Newman, “The rise of social media and its impact on mainstream journalism,” Reuters
Institute for the Study of Journalism, Tech. Rep., 2009.
[2] A. D. Santana, “Online readers’ comments represent new opinion pipeline,” Newspaper research
journal, vol. 32, no. 3, pp. 66–81, 2011.
[3] T. B. Ksiazek, L. Peer, and K. Lessard, “User engagement with online news: Conceptualizing
interactivity and exploring the relationship between online news videos and user comments,”
New media & society, vol. 18, no. 3, pp. 502–520, 2016.
[4] J. Bishop, “The psychology of trolling and lurking: The role of defriending and gamification
for increasing participation in online communities using seductive narratives,” in Gamification
for Human Factors Integration: Social, Education, and Psychological Issues. IGI Global,
2014, pp. 162–179.
[5] Forbes, “Is the era of reader comments on news websites fading?” https://www.forbes.
com/sites/kalevleetaru/2015/11/10/is-the-era-of-reader-comments-on-news-websites-fading/
#4becbc1e4379, 2018.
[6] E. E. Buckels, P. D. Trapnell, and D. L. Paulhus, “Trolls just want to have fun,” Personality
and individual Differences, vol. 67, pp. 97–102, 2014.
12
[7] C. Hallam and G. Zanella, “Online self-disclosure: The privacy paradox explained as a tem-
porally discounted balance between concerns and rewards,” Computers in Human Behavior,
vol. 68, pp. 217–227, 2017.
[8] J. Y. Bak, S. Kim, and A. Oh, “Self-disclosure and relationship strength in twitter conver-
sations,” in Proceedings of the 50th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational
Linguistics: Short Papers-Volume 2. Association for Computational Linguistics, 2012, pp.
60–64.
[9] L. C. Tidwell and J. B. Walther, “Computer-mediated communication effects on disclosure,
impressions, and interpersonal evaluations: Getting to know one another a bit at a time,”
Human communication research, vol. 28, no. 3, pp. 317–348, 2002.
[10] P. Umar, A. Squicciarini, and S. Rajtmajer, “Detection and analysis of self-disclosure in online
news commentaries,” in Proceedings of The Web Conference (WWW), 2019.
[11] W. F. Lloyd, Two Lectures on the Checks to Population. Oxford University Press (Colling-
wood), 1833.
[12] G. Hardin, “The tragedy of the commons,” Science, vol. 162, no. 3859, pp. 1243–1248, 1968.
[13] D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole, Game Theory. The MIT Press, 1991.
[14] S. J. Brams, Game Theory and Politics. Dover Press, 2004.
[15] S. A. Levin, “Transition matrix model for evolutionary game dynamics,” PNAS, vol. 111, pp.
10 838–10 845, 2014.
[16] J. O. Ledyard, “Public goods: A survey of experimental research,” in The Handbook of Ex-
perimental Economics, J. Kagel and A. Roth, Eds. Princeton University Press, 1995, pp.
111–194.
[17] M. Archetti and I. Scheuring, “Game theory of public goods in one-shot social dilemmas
without assortment,” Journal of theoretical biology, vol. 299, pp. 9–20, 2012.
[18] M. J. Young and A. Belmonte, “Convergence to fair contributions in a stochastic nonlinear
public goods game with random subgroup associations,” Working Paper (to be submitted),
2019.
[19] C. Hauert, S. De Monte, J. Hofbauer, and K. Sigmund, “Volunteering as red queen mechanism
for cooperation in public goods games,” Science, vol. 296, no. 5570, pp. 1129–1132, 2002.
[20] C. Hauert, A. Traulsen, H. D. S. ne´e Brandt, M. A. Nowak, and K. Sigmund, “Public goods
with punishment and abstaining in finite and infinite populations,” Biological theory, vol. 3,
no. 2, pp. 114–122, 2008.
[21] E. Fehr and S. Gachter, “Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments,” American
Economic Review, vol. 90, no. 4, pp. 980–994, 2000.
[22] C. Hauert, “Replicator dynamics of reward & reputation in public goods games,” Journal of
theoretical biology, vol. 267, no. 1, pp. 22–28, 2010.
13
[23] J. Barua, D. Patel, and V. Goyal, “Tide: Template-independent discourse data extraction,” in
International Conference on Big Data Analytics and Knowledge Discovery. Springer, 2015,
pp. 149–162.
[24] R. Wilson, “Computing equilibria of n-person games,” SIAM J. Appl. Math., vol. 21, no. 1,
pp. 80–87, 1971.
[25] J. F. Nash, “Equilibrium points in n-person games,” PNAS, vol. 36, no. 1, pp. 48–49, 1950.
[26] C. E. Lemke and J. T. Howson, “Equilibrum points of bimatrix games,” J. Soc. Indust. Appl.
Math., vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 413–423, 1961.
[27] A. Matsumoto and F. Szidarovszky, Game theory and its applications. Springer, 2016.
[28] C. Chen and O. L. Mangasarian, “A class of smoothing functions for nonlinear and mixed
complementarity problems,” Computational Optimization and Applications, vol. 5, no. 2, pp.
97–138, 1996.
[29] J. Ilavsky and P. R. Jemian, “Irena: tool suite for modeling and analysis of small-angle scat-
tering,” Journal of Applied Crystallography, vol. 42, no. 2, pp. 347–353, 2009.
[30] S. P. Dirkse and M. C. Ferris, “The path solver: a nommonotone stabilization scheme for mixed
complementarity problems,” Optimization Methods and Software, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 123–156,
1995.
[31] S. C. Billups, S. P. Dirkse, and M. C. Ferris, “A comparison of large scale mixed complemen-
tarity problem solvers,” Computational Optimization and Applications, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 3–25,
1997.
14
